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Abstract—We propose a new location-based beamforming
(LBB) scheme for wiretap channels, where a multi-antenna
source communicates with a single-antenna legitimate receiver in
the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper. We assume that all
channels are in a Rician fading environment, the channel state
information from the legitimate receiver is perfectly known at
the source, and that the only information on the eavesdropper
available at the source is her location. We first describe how the
optimal beamforming vector that minimizes the secrecy outage
probability of the system is obtained, illustrating its dependence
on the eavesdropper’s location. We then derive an easy-to-
compute expression for the secrecy outage probability when our
proposed LBB scheme is adopted. We also consider the positive
impact a friendly jammer can have on our beamforming solution,
showing how the path to optimality remains the same. Finally,
we investigate the impact of location uncertainty on the secrecy
outage probability, showing how our solution can still allow for
secrecy even when the source only has a noisy estimate of the
eavesdropper’s location. Our work demonstrates how a multi-
antenna array, operating in the most general channel conditions
and most likely system set-up, can be configured rapidly in the
field so as to deliver an optimal physical layer security solution.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, wiretap channel, Rician
fading, secrecy outage, jamming.
I. INTRODUCTION
PHYSICAL layer security has attracted significant researchattention recently. Compared to the traditional upper-
layer cryptographic techniques using secret keys, physical
layer security safeguards wireless communications by directly
exploiting the randomness offered by wireless channels with-
out using secret keys, and thus has been recognized as an
alternative for cryptographic techniques [1]. The principle of
physical layer security was first studied in [2] assuming single-
input single-output systems. It was shown that secrecy can
only exist when the wiretap channel between the source and
the eavesdropper is a degraded version of the main channel
between the source and the legitimate receiver. Subsequently,
this result was generalized to the case where the main channel
and the wiretap channel are independent [3].
More recently, implementing multi-input multi-output
(MIMO) techniques at the source/legitimate receiver has been
shown to significantly improve the physical layer security of
wiretap channels [4–16]. In terms of MIMO techniques, beam-
forming [4–9], artificial noise [10–13], and transmit antenna
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selection [14–16] are just a few techniques that can be utilized
to boost the physical layer security of wiretap channels. In
[4–16], it is assumed that the channel state information (CSI)
from the eavesdropper is perfectly or statistically known at
the source. This assumption, however, is unlikely to be valid
in practice - especially when the eavesdropper is not an
authorized component of the communication system.
In this paper we propose a location-based beamforming
(LBB) scheme that does not require the eavesdropper pass her
(instantaneous or statistical) CSI back to the source. Rather,
we will assume that some a priori known location information
of the eavesdropper is available at the source. Such a scenario
can occur in many circumstances, such as those detailed in
[17]. In our scheme, we assume that all of the communication
channels are in a Rician fading environment. That is, all the
channels can vary from pure line-of-sight (LOS) channel to
pure Rayleigh channel as the Rician K-factors in the channels
change. We also assume that the CSI from the legitimate
receiver is perfectly known at the source, while the only
information on the eavesdropper available at the source is her
location1. Our key goal is to determine the beamforming vector
at the source that minimizes the secrecy outage probability
of the system, given the CSI of the main channel and the
eavesdropper’s location.
Perhaps the most relevant works to ours are those of [17]
and [19]. In [17], the secrecy outage probability of a LBB
scheme in Rician wiretap channels was investigated, under
the assumptions that the location of the legitimate receiver
was available and location of the eavesdropper was available.
Different from [17], our two assumptions are that the location
of the eavesdropper is available and the CSI from the legiti-
mate receiver is available. That is, the assumption set we adopt
in this work is different. Based on this latter assumption set,
we propose a new LBB scheme that minimizes the secrecy
outage probability. We note that, the new assumption set we
adopt will lead to a reduction in the secrecy outage probability
(relative to [17]), but (more importantly) will also enable us to
determine the optimal beamforming vector at the source in a
more efficient manner. In [19], the secrecy outage probability
was examined in Rician wiretap channels where the source
is equipped with a large number of antennas. Different from
[19], our proposed scheme applies for an arbitrary number of
1Strictly speaking we must also assume a limit on the size of the eavesdrop-
per’s device, as this size-limit in effect places an upper limit of the number of
antennas at the eavesdropper that obtain uncorrelated signals. Increasing the
number of correlated antennas at the eavesdropper will increase her signal-
to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) [18]. We note that the SINR at the
eavesdropper is also limited (ultimately) by the size of the device.
2antennas at the source. Moreover, we introduce a jammer to
the system. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We derive a simple expression of the secrecy outage
probability when the eavesdropper’s location and the CSI
of the main channel are known. We highlight that our
expression is valid for arbitrary values of SINR and
Rician K factors in the main channel and the channel
between the source and the eavesdropper.
• Based on this new expression, we develop a much more
efficient search algorithm for the determination of the
optimal beamforming scheme that minimizes the secrecy
outage probability when the CSI of the main channel and
the eavesdropper’s location are available at the source. We
highlight that our new search algorithm invokes a one-
dimensional search, as opposed to the multi-dimensional
searches required previously, thereby greatly reducing the
computational complexity (important for in-filed deploy-
ment).
• We derive an approximate expression of the secrecy
outage probability of the system with the jammer for the
special case where the Rician K-factor of the jammer-
eavesdropper channel is 0, which provides a computa-
tionally efficient way to characterize the secrecy outage
probability of the system with the jammer when the
jammer-eavesdropper channel is in a pure Rayleigh fad-
ing environment.
• We examine the impact of location uncertainty on the
secrecy outage probability, showing how secrecy can still
exist when only a noisy estimate of the eavesdropper’s
location is available at the source.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the system model considered in the paper. In Section
III, we detail the proposed LBB scheme in Rician wiretap
channels without the jammer. In Section IV, we examine
the proposed LBB scheme in Rician wiretap channels with
the jammer. Numerical results and related discussions are
presented in Section V. Finally, Section VI draws conclusions.
Notations: Column vectors (matrices) are denoted by bold-
face lower (upper) case letters. Transpose and conjugate trans-
pose are denoted by (·)T and (·)H , respectively. Complex
Gaussian distribution is denoted by CN . An imaginary number
is denoted by j. A 1×m zero vector is denoted by 01×m. An
m×m zero matrix and an m×m identity matrix are denoted by
0m and Im, respectively. Statistical expectation and Statistical
variance are denoted by E and Var, respectively. The diagonal
elements of a matrix is denoted by diag [·]. The trace of a
matrix is denoted by Tr {·}. The absolute value of a scalar is
denoted by | · |. The Frobenius norm of a vector or a matrix
is denoted by ‖ · ‖.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wiretap channel with Rician fading consisting
of a source (Alice), a destination (Bob), a Jammer (J), and
an eavesdropper (Eve), as shown in Fig. 1. In this channel,
Alice communicates with Bob in the presence of Eve. Si-
multaneously, J transmits the jamming signals to degrade the
quality of the received signals at Eve, while maintaining the
Fig. 1. Illustration of our wiretap channel with Rician fading. The Rician
fading between all devices is assumed general, covering pure LOS through to
pure Rayleigh fading. Real-world-channels lie somewhere in between these
extremes. Note this figure serves to define the angles used in the main text
and the distances between devices.
quality of the received signals at Bob. Alice, J, and Eve are
equipped with uniform linear arrays (ULA) with Na, Nj and
Ne antennas, respectively, while Bob is equipped with a single
antenna. We adopt the polar coordinate system. As such, the
locations of Alice, Bob, J, and Eve are denoted by (0, 0),
(dab, θab), (daj , θaj) and (dae, θae), respectively. We assume
that all the channels are subject to quasi-static independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d) Rician fading with different
Rician K-factors. We assume that (via a priori measurement
campaigns) the K-factors and path loss exponents of all
relevant channels are known, and that the CSI of the main
channel between Alice and Bob is known to Alice. We also
assume that the CSI of the J-Bob channel is known to J.
We further assume that Eve’s location is available at Alice.
We clarify that in practice Alice can obtain Eve’s location
in a wide range of scenarios [17]. For instance, a military
scenario where Eve’s location can be determined through some
visual surveillance, Eve communicates with other systems (and
therefore Alice can determine her location by detecting her
signals), and Eve has a fixed known location (e.g., Eve is a
base station). To make progress we will first assume Eve’s
location is known exactly, turning to noisy estimates later in
the paper.
We denote hqb, q ∈ {a, j}, as the channel vector from Alice
or J to Bob, which is given by
hqb =
√
Kqb
1 +Kqb
hoqb +
√
1
1 +Kqb
hrqb, (1)
where Kqb denotes the Rician K-factor in the channel from
Alice (q = a) or J (q = j) to Bob, hoqb denotes the LOS
component in the channel from Alice or J to Bob, and hrqb
denotes the scattered component in the channel from Alice
or J to Bob - the elements of which are assumed to be i.i.d
complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit
variance. In (1), hoqb is defined as [20]
hoqb =
[
1, · · · , exp (j2pi (Nq − 1)) δq cos θqb
]
, (2)
3where δq denotes the constant spacing, in wavelengths between
adjacent antennas of the ULA at Alice or J.
We denote Gqe as the channel matrix from Alice or J to
Eve, which is given by
Gqe =
√
Kqe
1 +Kqe
Goqe +
√
1
1 +Kqe
Grqe, (3)
where Kqe denotes the Rician K-factor in the channel from
Alice or J to Eve, Goqe denotes the LOS component in the
channel from Alice or J to Eve, and Grqe denotes the scattered
component in the channel from Alice or J to Eve - the elements
of which are assumed to be i.i.d complex Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and unit variance. In (3), Goqe is
expressed as [21],
Goqe =
(
roqe
)
goqe, (4)
where roqe denotes the array response of Alice or J’s transmit-
ted signals at Eve, which is given by
roqe =
[
1, · · · , exp (−j2pi (Ne − 1) δe cosφqe)
]
, (5)
where δe denotes the constant spacing, in wavelengths, be-
tween adjacent antennas of the ULA at Eve, and φqe denotes
the angle of arrival from Eve to Alice or J (see Fig. 1), and
goqe denotes the array response at Alice or J, which is given
by
goqe =
[
1, · · · , exp (j2pi (Nq − 1) δq cos θqe)
]
. (6)
where θqe denotes the angle from Alice or J to Eve.
We assume that J transmits the jamming signal to degrade
the quality of the received signal at Eve, while maintaining
the quality of the received signal at Bob. As such, we design
the jamming signal from J as
xAN =WANtAN, (7)
where WAN is an Nj × (Nj − 1) beamforming matrix used
to transmit the jamming signal, and tAN is an (Nj − 1) × 1
vector of the jamming signal. In designing xAN, we choose
WAN as the orthonormal basis of the null space of hjb. We
then choose tAN to satisfy E
[
tANt
H
AN
]
= 1Nj−1INj−1. Such a
design ensures that Tr
{
xANx
H
AN
}
= 1.
According to (1)–(7), we express the received signal at Bob
as
yb =
√
Pad
−ηab
ab habxa + nb, (8)
where Pa denotes the transmit power at Alice, ηab denotes the
path loss exponent of the main channel (as in [17] all path loss
exponents will be a function of the sender-receiver channel,
i.e. device locations), and nb denotes the thermal noise at Bob
- which is assumed to be a complex Gaussian random variable
with zero mean and variance σ2b , i.e., nb ∼ CN
(
0, σ2b
)
. In (8),
xa is expressed as
xa = wta, (9)
where w denotes the Na × 1 beamforming vector2, and ta is
a scalar, which denotes the information signal transmitted by
2We correct a typographical error in [22] here by setting w as a row vector.
Alice. We assume that ‖w‖2 = 1 and E [|ta|2] = 1. We then
express the received signal at Eve as
ye =
√
Pad
−ηae
ae Gaexa +
√
Pjd
−ηje
je GjexAN + ne, (10)
where Pj denotes the transmit power at J, dje denotes the
distance between J and Eve, ηae and ηje denote the path
loss exponents in the Alice-Eve channel and J-Eve channel,
respectively, and ne denotes the thermal noise vector at Eve
- the elements of which are assumed to be i.i.d complex
Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance σ2e ,
i.e., ne ∼ (0Ne×1, INe).
As such, we express the received SINR at Bob as
γb = γ˜ab|habw|2, (11)
where γ˜ab = Pad−ηabab /σ2b .
In order to maximize the probability of successful eaves-
dropping, we assume that Eve applies the minimum mean
square error (MMSE) combining to process her received
signal. As per the rules of MMSE combining [23] , we express
the instantaneous SINR at Eve as
γe = γ˜aew
HGHaeM
−1Gaew, (12)
where γ˜ae = Pad−ηaeae /σ2e and
M =
γ˜je
Nj − 1GjeWANW
H
ANG
H
je + INe (13)
with γ˜je = Pjd
−ηje
je /σ
2
e .
Based on (11) and (12), the achievable secrecy rate in the
wiretap channel is expressed as [24]
Cs =
{
Cb − Ce, γb > γe
0, γe ≤ γe, (14)
where Cb = log2 (1 + γb) is the capacity of the main channel,
and Ce = log2 (1 + γe) is the capacity of the Alice-Eve
channel. In this wiretap channel, if Cs ≥ Rs, where Rs
denotes a given secrecy transmission rate, the perfect secrecy is
guaranteed. If Cs < Rs, information on the transmitted signal
is leaked to Eve, and the secrecy is compromised. In order
to evaluate the secrecy performance of the wiretap channel in
detail, we adopt the secrecy outage probability as the perfor-
mance metric - defined as the probability that the achievable
secrecy rate is less than a given secrecy transmission rate
conditioned on γb. Mathematically, this is formulated as
Pout (Rs) = Pr (Cs < Rs|γb) . (15)
Our goal is to find the optimal beamforming vector that
minimizes the secrecy outage probability. That is, we wish to
find
w∗ = argmin
w,‖w‖2=1
Pout (Rs) . (16)
4III. LOCATION-BASED BEAMFORMING WITHOUT JAMMER
In this section we assume that J is not transmitting (i.e.,
Pj = 0), describing in detail how the optimal beamforming
scheme (that minimizes the secrecy outage probability) is
obtained through the use of Bob’s CSI and Eve’s location.
We also derive an easy-to-compute expression for the secrecy
outage probability when the proposed LBB scheme is applied.
We first re-express ye in (10) when J is not transmitting as
ye =
√
Pad
−ηae
ae Gaexa + ne. (17)
We then re-express γe in (12) when J is not transmitting as
γe = γ˜ae‖Gaew‖2. (18)
In order to solve (16), we present the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Given τ ∈ [0, 1], the optimal beamforming
vector w∗ that minimizes the secrecy outage probability is a
member of the following family of beamformer solutions,
w (τ) =
√
τw1 +
√
1− τw2. (19)
Here, w1 =
Ψ
⊥
Goae
h
H
ab
‖Ψ⊥
Goae
hH
ab
‖
, where Ψ⊥
Goae
= INa −
(Goae)
H
(
Goae (G
o
ae)
H
)−1
Goae; and w2 =
ΨGoae
h
H
ab
‖ΨGoaeh
H
ab
‖
, where
ΨGoae = (G
o
ae)
H
(
Goae (G
o
ae)
H
)−1
Goae.
Proof: Based on (17) and (18), we re-express Pout (Rs)
in (15) when J is not transmitting as
Pout (Rs) = Pr (Cb − Ce < Rs|γb)
= Pr (Ce > Cb −Rs|γb)
= Pr
(
γe > 2
−Rs (1 + γb)− 1
)
. (20)
According to (20), we find that Pout (Rs) increases
as γb decreases and γe increases. Suppose that
{w1,w2,w3, · · · ,wNa} denotes an orthonormal basis
in the complex space CNa . As such, any beamforming vector
at Alice can be expressed as [25]
w = λ1w1 + λ2w2 +
Na∑
l=3
λlwl, (21)
where λ = [λ1, λ2, · · · , λNa ] are complex and ‖λ‖2 = 1.
Based on (11) and (18), we first note that both γb and γe are
functions of w. We then note that γb decreases when λl 6= 0.
This is due to the fact that wl are orthogonal to the plane
spanned by {w1,w2} and the main channel hab lies in this
plane. We also find that γe increases when λl 6= 0 unless
the Alice-Eve channel Gae also lies in the plane spanned by
{w1,w2}.
Based on the above analysis, we see that γb decreases and
γe increases when λl 6= 0, which leads to the increase in
Pout (Rs). As such, we confirm that we need to set λl = 0
in order to minimize the secrecy outage probability, and the
optimal beamforming vector has the following structure, given
by,
w (τ) =
√
τ exp (jθ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ1
w1 +
√
1− τ exp (jθ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ2
w2. (22)
We note that θ1 and θ2 in (22) are general phases having
no impact on Cs, thus without loss of generality we can set
θ1 = θ2 = 0. Substituting θ1 = θ2 = 0 into (22) we obtain
the desired result in (19), which completes the proof.
With the aid of Proposition 1, we note that the optimal
beamforming vector w∗ that solves (16) can be obtained by
finding the optimal τ∗ that minimizes the secrecy outage
probability. As such, we re-express (16) as
τ∗ = argmin
0≤τ≤1
Pout (Rs) . (23)
We highlight that Proposition 1 provides a far more efficient
way of obtaining the optimal beamforming vector w∗ that
solves (16) compared to an exhaustive search. This is due to
the fact that an exhaustive search is performed in the complex
space CNa . Consequently, the computational complexity of the
exhaustive search grows exponentially as Na increases. This
is to be compared with our method in Proposition 1 which
involves a one-dimensional search of τ∗ only, regardless of
the value of Na. We note when Bob is equipped with multiple
antennas, and a single-stream transmission from Alice occurs,
Proposition 1 applies directly. This is due to the fact that
placing more antennas at Bob only impacts the received SINR
at Bob. In such circumstances the secrecy outage probability
decreases. We also note that a similar result of Proposition 1
was obtained in [26], which was derived from maximizing the
expected achievable rate in cooperative relay networks.
We now present the expression of the secrecy outage
probability when w (τ) is adopted as the beamforming vector
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The secrecy outage probability when w (τ) =√
τw1 +
√
1− τw2 is adopted as the beamforming vector is
given by
Pout (Rs) = 1−
γ
(
Nemˆae,
2−Rs(1+γb)−1
mˆ−1ae γe
)
Γ (Nemˆae)
, (24)
where γ (·, ·) is the lower incomplete gamma function, defined
as [27, Eq. (8.350)],
γ (µ, ν) =
∫ ν
0
exp (−t) tµ−1dt, (25)
mˆae =
(
Kˆae + 1
)2
2Kˆae + 1
, (26)
where Kˆae = |goaew (τ) |2Kae,
γe = E [γe] =
(
Kae|goaew (τ) |2 + 1
)
γ˜ae
1 +Kae
, (27)
and Γ (·) is the Gamma function, defined as [27, Eq. (8.310)],
Γ (z) =
∫ ∞
0
exp (−t) tz−1dt. (28)
Proof: We focus on the probability density function
(PDF) of γe whenw (τ) is adopted as the beamforming vector,
which is expressed as [17]
fγe (x) =
(
mˆae
γe
)Nemˆae xNemˆae−1
Γ (Nemˆae)
exp
(
−mˆaex
γe
)
. (29)
5The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γe is then
obtained as
Fγe (x) =
γ
(
Nemˆae,
mˆaex
γe
)
Γ (Nemˆae)
. (30)
We then re-express Pout (Rs) in (20) as
Pout (Rs) = 1− Fγe
(
2−Rs (1 + γb)− 1
)
. (31)
Substituting (30) into (31), we obtain the desired result in
Theorem 1. The proof is completed.
Note, in Theorem 1 Eve’s location is explicitly expressed in
the expressions for mˆae, Kˆae, and γe. Note also, that our
derived expression is valid for arbitrary values of average
SINRs and Rician K-factors in the main channel and the
Alice-Eve channel. In the following, we detail how the optimal
τ∗ that minimizes Pout (Rs) can be obtained per block by
applying Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to determine τ∗ per block when J is
not transmitting
Input: hab
Output: τ∗.
1: Calculate w1 and w2.
2: for every τ ∈ [0, 1] with step size δt do
3: Calculate w (τ) using (19).
4: Calculate Pout (Rs) using (24).
5: end for
6: Choose τ∗ as the value of τ that achieves the minimum
Pout (Rs).
We now evaluate the computational demands of Algorithm
1. For a given Na, Ne, and δt, Algorithm 1 requires 2δ−1t
gamma function calculations. We note that the complexity
for the gamma function calculation is O
(
n5/2 (logn)
2
)
[28],
where n denotes the number of digits used. For anticipated
values of Na, Ne, δt = 10−2, and assuming 64-bit processing,
the number of floating-point operations for Algorithm 1 is of
order 106 (note, δt = 10−2 leads to a negligible error of 1
part in 104 compared to the true minimum secrecy outage
probability). Assuming 4 floating-point operations per cycle,
106 operations can be completed on a single-core 64-bit 2.5
GHz microprocessor within 1 ms. As such, Algorithm 1 can
be performed in real-time with negligible latency impact3. On
the other hand, an exhaustive search of the optimal beamform-
ing vector w∗ that minimizes Pout (Rs) requires 2
(
δ−1t
)2Na
gamma function calculations. We note that 2
(
δ−1t
)2Na gamma
function calculations require of order 1012 floating-point op-
erations for Na = 2, and δt = 10−2. Moreover, the number
of floating-point operations for an exhaustive search grows
exponentially with Na. As such, an exhaustive search is simply
not practical in real-world deployments.
3The computation time of Algorithm 1 on MATLAB is less than 0.25 s
on a quad-core 64-bit 3.3 GHz Intel i5-2500 microprocessor. Based on the
conversion factor from MATLAB to embedded C++ firmware, we estimate
the per block latency to be less than 0.5 ms [29], while the coherence time
of the channel is hundreds of milliseconds for stationary nodes [30].
We point out that φae disappears in the expression for the
secrecy outage probability in Theorem 1. As an aside, it is
perhaps interesting to show why this is so. To this end, we
re-express γe in (18) as
γe = γ˜ae
Ne∑
i=1
|gae,iw (τ) |2, (32)
where gae,i is the 1 × Na channel vector between Alice and
i-th Eve’s antenna, given by
gae,i =
√
Kae
1 +Kae
roae,ig
o
ae +
√
1
1 +Kae
grae,i, (33)
where roae,i is the i-th element of roae, given by roae,i =
exp (−j2pi (i− 1) δe cosφae) and grae,i is the i-th row ofGrae.
Based on (33), we express gae,iw (τ) as
gae,iw (τ) =
√
Kae
1 +Kae
roae,ig
o
aew (τ)
+
√
1
1 +Kae
grae,iw (τ) . (34)
We note that |roae,igoaew (τ) |2 = |goaew (τ) |2 for any roae,i. As
such, we confirm that roae has no impact on the secrecy outage
probability. This reveals that our analysis is also applicable for
antennas arrays other than ULA at Eve, since different antenna
arrays at Eve only impact roae. In addition, we confirm that our
analysis is also applicable for antenna arrays other than ULA
at Alice and Bob, respectively. This is because we assume that
the CSI of the Alice-Bob channel is known to Alice.
IV. LOCATION-BASED BEAMFORMING WITH JAMMER
In this section we examine the case when J is transmitting
(i.e., Pj > 0). We shall see of course that a jammer assists the
performance. We will also see that, in principal, a modified
(more complex) Algorithm 1 can be used to determine the
optimal beamformer in the presence of the jammer. However,
we will also see that the previous beamforming solution de-
rived directly from Algorithm 1, when used in the presence of
a jammer, leads to a performance that is very close to optimal
when the number of antenna at Alice is greater than two. This
means that in practice the beamforming solution derived from
Algorithm 1 will actually suffice in most circumstances.
To make progress, we present the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Given τ ∈ [0, 1], the optimal beamforming
vector w∗ that minimizes the secrecy outage probability of
Rician wiretap channels with a jammer is also a member of
the following family of beamformer solutions,
w (τ) =
√
τw1 +
√
1− τw2. (35)
Proof: Let R = γ˜jeNj−1GjeWANWHANGHje, the eigenvalue
decomposition of R is given by R = UHΛU, where U is
an Ne×Ne unitary matrix, and Λ = diag [Λ1, · · · ,ΛNe], and
where Λ1, · · · ,ΛNe are eigenvalues of R. Based on R and
6Λ, we re-express the instantaneous SINR at Eve in (12) as
γe =γ˜aew
HGHaeU
H (Λ+ INe)
−1
UGaew
=γ˜ae
[
µH1 , · · · , µHNe
] 
1
Λ1+1
, · · · , 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0, · · · , 1ΛNe+1



 µ1..
.
µNe


=
Ne∑
i=1
|µi|2
Λi + 1
, (36)
where ui denotes the i-th element of UGaew. Suppose νi is
the i-th element of Gaew, we express the instantaneous SINR
at Eve when J is not transmitting as
γe =γ˜aew
HGHaeGaew
=γ˜ae
[
νH1 , · · · , νHNe
] ν1..
.
νNe


=γ˜ae
Ne∑
i=1
|νi|2. (37)
We note that νi and µi have the same PDF due to the fact that
U is a unitary matrix. We re-express Pout (Rs) in (15) as
Pout (Rs) =Pr (Cb − Ce < Rs|γb)
=Pr (Ce > Cb −Rs|γb)
=Pr
(
γe > 2
−Rs (1 + γb)− 1
)
=Pr
(
γ˜ae
Ne∑
i=1
|µi|2
Λi + 1
> 2−Rs (1 + γb)− 1
)
=Pr
(
γ˜ae
Ne∑
i=1
|µi|2> 1
k
(
2−Rs (1 + γb)− 1
))
, (38)
where k =
∑Ne
i=1
|µi|
2
Λi+1∑Ne
i=1
|µi|2
. We then re-express Pout (Rs) in (15)
when J is not transmitting as
Pout (Rs) = Pr
(
γ˜ae
Ne∑
i=1
|νi|2 > 2−Rs (1 + γb)− 1
)
. (39)
Since νi and µi have the same PDF, we re-write (38) as
Pout (Rs) =Pr
(
γ˜ae
Ne∑
i=1
|µi|2> 1
k
(
2−Rs (1 + γb)− 1
))
=Pr
(
γ˜ae
Ne∑
i=1
|νi|2> 1
k
(
2−Rs (1 + γb)− 1
))
. (40)
Observing (39) and (40), we find that the only difference
between Pout (Rs) when J is not transmitting and Pout (Rs)
when J is transmitting is the factor k−1. Therefore, our analysis
in Proposition 1, which is suitable for Rician wiretap channels
without the jammer, still holds for channels with the jammer.
According to Proposition 1, the optimal beamforming vector
that minimizes Pout (Rs) when J is not transmitting is a
member of the family of beamformer solutions, given by
w (τ) =
√
τw1 +
√
1− τw2. As such, we obtain that the
optimal beamforming vector that minimizes Pout (Rs) when
J is transmitting is also a member of such a family of
beamformer solutions. We note that the optimal value of τ
that minimizes Pout (Rs) when J is transmitting is different
from the optimal τ∗ that minimizes Pout (Rs) when J is not
transmitting due to the factor k−1. The proof is completed.
According to Proposition 2, we note that the optimal w∗ at
Alice that minimizes Pout (Rs) can be obtained by determining
the optimal τ∗j that minimizes Pout (Rs) when J is transmitting.
As such, we re-express (16) as
τ∗j = argmin
0≤τ≤1
Pout (Rs) . (41)
We note that the analytical form of Pout (Rs) for general
Kje is mathematically intractable since we cannot obtain the
closed-form expression for the PDF of γe. As such, in order
to obtain the optimal τ∗j that minimizes Pout (Rs), we apply
a modified Algorithm 1, in which we numerically calculate
Pout (Rs). Specifically, we first generate N realizations of Grae
and Grje, we then calculate Cs using (14) for every Grae
and Grje. Finally, we calculate Pout (Rs) using (15). For the
same level of performance we find the modified algorithm
costs approximately 10 times more computational time relative
to Algorithm 1 - and therefore is still viable in real-world
deployments. However, as we discuss later, we shall see that
in practice the solution provided directly by Algorithm 1 will
actually suffice in most circumstances - even when the jammer
is present.
Moreover, we find that an approximate expression of
Pout (Rs) for the special case where Kje = 0 is obtainable.
We note that such a special case is practical in scenarios where
the J-Eve channel is completely blocked (e.g. Eve is in hiding)
by buildings. In order to examine the approximate expression
of Pout (Rs) for the special case where Kje = 0, we first
introduce several new notations as follows:
ϕl =
1
(1 +Kae)
l
l∑
m=0
(
l
m
)(
Kae|Goaew (τ) |2
)m
(Ne)m
, l ∈ {1, 2}
(42)
with (Ne)m =
Γ(Ne+m)
Γ(Ne)
, and
ϑl =
l exp
(
1
κ
)
κNj−1
Ne−1∑
p=0
ρp
l−1+p∑
t=0
(
l − 1 + p
t
)(
− 1
κ
)l−1+p−t
× Γ
(
t−Nj + 2, 1
κ
)
, (43)
respectively. In (43), κ = γ˜jeNj−1 ,
ρp = κ
p
p∑
q=max(0,p−Nj+1)
(
Nj − 1
p− q
)
1
q!κq
, (44)
and Γ (·, ·) is the upper incomplete Gamma function, defined
as [27, Eq. (8.350)]
Γ (µ, ν) =
∫ ∞
ν
exp (−t) tµ−1dt. (45)
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Fig. 2. Pout (Rs) versus τ for different values of Na with Ne = 2, Kab =
10 dB, Kae = 5 dB, γ˜ab = γ˜ae = 10 dB, θab = pi/3, θae = pi/4, and
Rs = 1 bits/s/Hz. J is not transmitting here.
Theorem 2: When Kje = 0, the approximate secrecy out-
age probability of Rician wiretap channels with a jammer is
Pout (Rs) = 1−
γ
(
α, 2
−Rs (1+γb)−1
β
)
Γ (α)
, (46)
where
α =
ϕ21ϑ
2
1
ϕ2ϑ2 − ϕ21ϑ21
, (47)
and
β = γ˜ae
(
ϕ2ϑ2 − ϕ21ϑ21
)
ϕ1ϑ1
. (48)
Proof: See Appendix A.
We highlight that the approximate expression of the secrecy
outage probability in (46) is valid for arbitrary values of
average SINRs and Rician K-factors in the main channel and
the Alice-Eve channel.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to validate our
analysis. Specifically, we first demonstrate the effectiveness of
the proposed LBB scheme in Rician wiretap channels where
only Alice, Bob, and Eve are involved. We then demonstrate
the effectiveness of the scheme when J is transmitting. Finally,
we examine the impact of Eve’s location uncertainty on
secrecy performance of the scheme. Throughout this section,
we assume that all the channels have the same path loss
exponent, i.e., ηab = ηae = ηje = 4.
We first examine the effectiveness of the scheme when J
is not transmitting in Figs. 2–4. In Fig. 2, we plot Pout (Rs)
versus τ for different values of Na with Ne = 2, Kab = 10 dB,
Kae = 5 dB, γ˜ab = γ˜ae = 10 dB, θab = pi/3, θae = pi/4,
and Rs = 1 bits/s/Hz. We first observe that the analytical
curves, generated from Proposition 1 and Theorem 1, precisely
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Fig. 3. P ∗out (Rs) versus γ˜ab for different values of Na with Ne = 2,
Kab = 10 dB, Kae = 5 dB, γ˜ae = 10 dB, θab = pi/3, θae = pi/4, and
Rs = 1 bits/s/Hz. J is not transmitting here.
match the simulation points marked by black dots, thereby
demonstrating the correctness of our analysis for Pout (Rs) in
Proposition 1 and Theorem 1. Second, we see that there exists
a unique τ∗ that minimizes Pout (Rs) for each Na. Third, we
see that the minimum Pout (Rs), denoted by P ∗out (Rs), de-
creases significantly as Na increases. Furthermore, we observe
that the optimal τ∗ that achieves P ∗out (Rs) approaches 1 as Na
increases. This reveals that the optimal beamforming vector
w∗ that minimizes Pout (Rs) approaches w1 as Na increases.
In Fig. 3, we plot P ∗out (Rs) versus γ˜ab for different values
of Na. In this figure, we have adopted the same system config-
urations as those in Fig. 2. The analytical curves, represented
by red dashed lines, are generated from Proposition 1 and
Theorem 1 with the optimal τ∗ which minimizes Pout (Rs)
being selected for different values of Na. The optimal beam-
former solutions, represented by ‘•’ symbols, are obtained
from minimizing Pout (Rs) via an exhaustive search (i.e., a
full multi-dimensional search) for different values of Na.
We first see that the minimum secrecy outage probability
P ∗out (Rs) achieved by our scheme is almost the same as the
optimal beamformer solution found via exhaustive search. This
shows the optimality of our scheme. Second, we see that
P ∗out (Rs) decreases significantly as Na increases. This reveals
that adding extra transmit antennas at Alice improves the
secrecy of the adopted system. We further see that P ∗out (Rs)
monotonically decreases as γ˜ab increase. This reveals that the
secrecy outage probability reduces when Alice uses a higher
power to transmit. Moreover, we note that the secrecy outage
probability achieved by our proposed scheme outperforms
that of solution from [17]. For instance, the secrecy outage
probability of our proposed scheme is almost three orders of
magnitude less than that of solution from [17] when Na = 3
and γ˜ab = 14 dB. This is due to the fact that we determine
the optimal beamforming vector that minimizes the secrecy
outage probability utilizing the CSI of the main channel and
8Kae
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Fig. 4. P ∗out (Rs) versus Kae for different values of Na with Ne = 2,
Kab = 10 dB, γ˜ae = 10 dB, θab = pi/3, θae = pi/4, and Rs = 1
bits/s/Hz. J is not transmitting here.
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Eve’s location, while the solution of [17] was determined using
Bob’s location and Eve’s location.
In Fig. 4, we plot P ∗out (Rs) versus Kae for different values
of Na. As in Fig. 3, the analytical curves are generated
from Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 with the optimal τ∗ being
selected for a given Na. Again, we see that the analytical
curves match the simulation points. We also see that as
expected P ∗out (Rs) decreases as Kae increases.
We then examine the effectiveness of the scheme when J
is transmitting in the following Figs. 5–6. To provide focus,
we consider the special case of Kje = 0. In Fig. 5, we
plot Pout (Rs) versus τ for different values of Na. We first
see that the analytical curves, generated from Proposition 2
and Theorem 2, effectively match the simulation points for
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Fig. 6. P ∗out (Rs) versus γ˜ab for different values of Na with Ne = 2,
Nj = 4, Kab = 10 dB, Kae = 5 dB, Kje = 0, γ˜ae = γ˜je = 10 dB,
θab = pi/3, θae = pi/4, and Rs = 1 bits/s/Hz. J is transmitting here.
Na > 2. We clarify that the gap between the analytical curve
and simulation points when Na = 2 is due to the fact that
we adopt a gamma approximation method to characterize the
distribution of the received SINR at Eve. We note that, the
small gap between the analytical curve and the simulations
when Na = 2 is a constant, revealing that we can still use
Proposition 2 and Theorem 2 to determine the optimal τ∗j
that minimizes Pout (Rs) even when Na = 2. We then see
that there exists a unique τ∗j that minimizes Pout (Rs) for
each Na. We also see that the optimal τ∗j that minimizes
Pout (Rs) decreases for each Na, compared to the optimal τ∗
that minimizes Pout (Rs) in Fig. 2. This is due to the fact that
the jamming signals degrade the quality of the received signals
at Eve.
In Fig. 6, we plot P ∗out (Rs) versus γ˜ab for different values of
Na. In this figure, we compare the secrecy performance of the
beamformer solution obtained from Proposition 1 and Theo-
rem 1 and the beamformer solution obtained from Proposition
2 and Theorem 2 to the secrecy performance of the optimal
beamformer solution. The beamformer solution obtained from
Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 and the beamformer solution
obtained from Proposition 2 and Theorem 2 are represented
by blue-dashed dotted lines and red-dashed lines, respectively.
The optimal solutions, represented by ‘•’ symbols, are ob-
tained from minimizing Pout (Rs) via an exhaustive search
for different values of Na. Similar as in Fig. 3, we first
observe that the minimum secrecy outage probability P ∗out (Rs)
achieved by the beamformer solution from Proposition 2 and
Theorem 2 is nearly the same as the optimal beamformer
solution found through exhaustive search. We then observe
that P ∗out (Rs) decreases significantly as Na decreases and
γ˜ab increases. Moreover, we observe that the gap between
the minimum Pout (Rs) achieved by the beamformer solution
from Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 and the minimum Pout (Rs)
achieved by the beamformer solution from Proposition 2 and
9(a) Kae = 0. (b) Kae = ∞. (c) Kae = 5 dB.
Fig. 7. Illustration of the optimal beamformer solutions for Rician wiretap
channels with Na = 2, Ne = 2, Kab = 10 dB, Kje = 0, γ˜ab = γ˜ae =
γ˜je = 10 dB. w∗ and w∗j denote the optimal beamformer solution when J is
not transmitting and the optimal beamformer solution when J is transmitting,
repectively. w∗ and w∗j are represented by blue dashed line and red solid
line, respectively.
Theorem 2 reduces as Na increases, revealing that, in Rician
wiretap channels with the jammer, the secrecy performance
of the beamformer solution obtained from Proposition 1 and
Theorem 1 (i.e., from Algorithm 1) is almost the same as
the secrecy performance of the beamformer solution obtained
from Proposition 2 and Theorem 2 when Na is larger than 2.
In Fig. 7, we provide a schematic view of the optimal beam-
former solutions for different values of Kae. For illustration
purpose, we denote w∗ as the optimal beamformer solution
when J is not transmitting. We also denote w∗j as the optimal
beamformer solution when J is transmitting. Fig. 7(a) shows
the optimal beamformer solutions when Kae = 0 (i.e, the
Alice-Eve channel is in a pure Rayleigh fading environment).
We see that w∗ and w∗j overlap with each other. We also
see that w∗ and w∗j are in the same direction as the main
channel hab, indicating that the optimal beamformer solutions
when Kae = 0 are the maximal-ratio transmission such that
the capacity of the main channel is maximized. Fig. 7(b)
shows the optimal beamformer solutions when Kae = ∞
(i.e., the Alice-Eve channel is in a pure LOS environment).
We see that w∗ and w∗j overlap with w1, revealing that
the optimal beamformer solutions are orthogonal to the LOS
component in the Alice-Eve channel Goae. Moreover, we
examine more general scenarios where Kae is between the
above two extremes. As a specific example, in Fig. 7(c) we
show the optimal beamformer solutions of our scheme for
Kae = 5 dB. We first see that w∗ and w∗j are in different
directions, which validates our analysis in Theorem 2. We then
see that w∗j is closer to the main channel hab, compared to
w∗. This is due to the fact that the jamming signals degrade
the quality of the received signals at Eve.
We now examine the impact of the uncertainty in Eve’s
location. To this end, we adopt the time difference of arrival
(TDOA) scheme discussed in [31] as the location estimation
scheme. We then introduce the covariance matrixVpos = J−1,
where J denotes the Fisher matrix for TDOA scheme (see [31]
for details). We further express Vpos as
Vpos =
[
σ2x σxy
σyx σ
2
y
]
, (49)
where the values of σx, σy , σxy , and σyx can be obtained
straightforwardly from the inverse of J. We denote Eve’s true
location as ζ0 = [x0, y0], Eve’s estimated location as ζe =
[xe, ye], and the correlation coefficient as ρ = σxy/ (σxσy) .
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Fig. 8. P out (Rs) versus τ for different values of cσt with Na = 4, Ne = 2,
Nj = 4, Kab = 10 dB, Kae = 5 dB, γ˜ab = γ˜ae = 10 dB, θab = pi/3,
θae = pi/4, and Rs = 1 bits/s/Hz.
As such, the distribution of Eve’s estimated location can be
expressed as
P (ζe) =
1
2pi
√
1− ρ2σxσy
exp
{
− 1
2 (1− ρ2)
(
(xe − x0)2
σ2x
+
(ye − y0)2
σ2y
− 2ρ (xe − x0) (ye − y0)
σxσy
)}
. (50)
In order to characterize the secrecy performance of the system,
we adopt an “average” measure of Pout (Rs), which is given
by [31, Eq.(44)]
P out (Rs) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
Pout (Rs)P (ξe) dxedye. (51)
In Fig. 8, we plot P out (Rs) versus τ for different levels
of Eve’s location uncertainty for both the case where J is not
transmitting and the case where J is transmitting. In this figure,
we adopt the TDOA scheme discussed in [31] as the location
estimation scheme. In the TDOA scheme, the level of Eve’s
location uncertainty is represented by cσt, where c is the speed
of the light, and σt is the standard deviation of the timings.
The larger cσt is, the less accurate Eve’s location is. In Fig.
8, we consider that Alice, Bob, and J are located at [0m, 0m],
[1225m, 707m], and [2000m, −3464m], respectively. We also
consider that the true location of Eve is [1000m, − 1000m]
(note the coordinates are chosen according to set angles).
We clarify that we choose this parameter setting to mimic
scenarios where the distance between nodes is relatively large.
We see that, for both cases, there exists a unique τ∗ that
minimizes P out (Rs) for each cσt. We also see that the mini-
mum P out (Rs) increases as cσt increases, which demonstrates
that the secrecy performance of our scheme decreases, as the
level of uncertainty in Eve’s location increases. Although not
completely shown here, we note that our results approach the
appropriate solutions as the location uncertainty approaches
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both zero and infinity (i.e., location unknown), and show
the expected trends between these two extremes. Moreover,
compared to the case where J is not transmitting, we can
observe that, for a specific cσt > 0, the minimum P out (Rs)
of the case where J is transmitting is decreased (as expected).
We note that similar trends and outcomes to those shown in
Fig. 8 were found for a wide range of antenna configurations,
transceiver locations, and Eve locations.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work we have proposed a new LBB solution for
Rician wiretap channels, in which a source communicates with
a legitimate receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper. In our
scheme, we assumed that the CSI from the legitimate receiver
is known at the source, while the only available information
on the eavesdropper at the source is her location. With no
jammer present, we showed how the beamforming vector that
minimizes the secrecy outage probability of the system can be
obtained in real-time. We also examined the optimal beam-
former solution in the presence of a multi-antenna jammer,
showing how our real-time no-jammer solution still provides
close-to-optimal performance in most practical scenarios. The
work reported here illustrates how in a range of realistic
wiretap channels, in which the only information known on
an eavesdropper is her location, a real-time solution to the
optimal beamformer can be determined and deployed.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In order to derive the secrecy outage probability for Rician
fading wiretap channels with a jammer for the special case
of Kje = 0, we first need to derive the PDF of γe. We
note that the closed-form expression for the PDF of γe is
mathematically intractable due to the fact that γe is a ran-
dom variable containing both the non-central complex normal
vector Gaew and the random matrix R. To address this
problem, we consider the use of the gamma approximation to
characterize the PDF of γe. Such an approximation has been
shown to be effective in accurately describing the distribution
of the received SINR of Rician fading channels with Rayleigh-
distributed co-channel interference [32]. As such, we express
the gamma approximations of the PDF γe as
fγe (x) =
xα−1 exp
(
− xβ
)
Γ (α)βα
, (52)
where α denotes the scale parameter of the gamma distri-
bution, and β denotes the shape parameter of the gamma
distribution. We have αβ and αβ2 represent the mean and
the variance of γe, respectively. We then express the CDF of
γe as
Fγe (γ) =
γ
(
α, xβ
)
Γ (α)
, (53)
We express the lth moment of γe as [33]
ξl = γ˜
l
aeϕlϑl, (54)
where ϕl and ϑl are as shown in (42) and (43), respectively.
Based on (54), we obtain the mean of γe as
E [γe] = γ˜aeϕ1ϑ1. (55)
We then obtain the variance of γe as
Var (γe) = γ˜2ae
(
ϕ2ϑ2 − ϕ21ϑ21
)
. (56)
From (55) and (56), we obtain α and β as
α =
ϕ21ϑ
2
1
ϕ2ϑ2 − ϕ21ϑ21
, (57)
and
β = γ˜ae
(
ϕ2ϑ2 − ϕ21ϑ21
)
ϕ1ϑ1
, (58)
respectively.
We then re-express Pout (Rs) in (15) as
Pout (Rs) = Pr (Cb − Ce < Rs|γb)
= Pr (Ce > Cb −Rs|γb)
= Pr
(
γe > 2
−Rs (1 + γb)− 1
)
= 1−
∫ 2−Rs (1+γb)−1
0
fγe (γ) dγ
= 1− Fγe
(
2−Rs (1 + γb)− 1
)
. (59)
Substituting (52), (53), (57), and (58) into (59), we obtain the
desired result in (46). The proof is completed.
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